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Introduction
This paper considers the problem of a fashion trend-setter that has to deal with an imitator who can produce the same product at a lower cost. A onedimensional product space is considered, which is an abstraction of the key attribute of some consumer good. An obvious example is the width of neckties, which we all have observed to vary over time. Other examples might include the extent to which accessories are ‡ashy or understated, the width of labels on sport coats, or the length of skirts. The trend-setter de…nes what is fashionable, and o¤-label brands imitate them. This paper suggests a novel explanation for the existence of fashion cycles, namely movement around a 'product space' that is strategic on the part of the fashion-setter and imitative on the part of low-cost competitors. In reality the product design space is of very high dimension, leaving lots of room for complex trajectories that never settle down to a single steady state. We will show, however, that such complexity is not essential to this story. Even in a one-dimensional abstraction of that space, the optimal solution may involve continual adaptation and imitation. Furthermore, a side bene…t of sticking with a one-dimensional product space is that we can write explicit expressions describing the thresholds between initial conditions where di¤erent strategies are optimal.
It turns out that the structure of the optimal solution depends on how much it costs to develop new designs and on the initial positions of both …rms in the product space . For low design costs it is optimal for the …rms to cycle around the product space inde…nitely, with a Skiba curve separating the two possible directions for changing the design initially.
For intermediate values of the cost, two other Skiba curves circumscribe an area in the middle of the product space where it is optimal for the fashion setter not to innovate, at least initially. In that case either the imitator simply catches up and conquers the whole market or the fashion setter changes its design later.
If the investment cost of making new designs is still larger, two other Skiba curves arise, which separate a policy of "never changing the design" from a policy where the market leader makes an initial major design change but no subsequent changes.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews some relevant literature.
The model is presented in Section 3. A short overview of the solution structure is provided in Section 4. Section 5 analyzes the solution structure when the costs of making new designs are so low that periodically changing designs forever is optimal. In Section 6 these costs are large enough that it is not optimal to change the design more than once . Section 7 considers parameter constellations where, depending on the initial situation, either periodic design changes or making no new designs at all can be optimal.
Literature Review
Firms engage in at least two kinds of product design innovation: technological innovation and stylistic or fashion innovation (Schweizer, 2003) . The former improves the product. E.g., computers today are faster than they were ten years ago. Fashion innovation di¤erentiates what's new from current models without improving functionality. For women's clothes, red may be "in" this year and blue may be "out", but that does not mean red is intrinsically better than blue. Certainly the color red is not a new invention per se. Furthermore, it is likely that in a few years blue will be in and red will be out, and a few years 4 after that, red will be in again. The same happens for the width of men's ties, the length of skirts, and the popularity of one material relative to another.
In short, we observe that consumers are willing to pay more for one good (the "in" good) than another, functionally equivalent product (the one that is "out"). Economists have long been fascinated by this counter-intuitive behavior, dubbed "Veblen e¤ects" in honor of Thornstein Veblen's seminal inquiries into conspicuous consumption (Bagwell and Bernheim, 1996) . Typical explanations involve "status" or "prestige" goods conferring utility on their consumers by allowing implicit association with other high-status consumers of that good. If a good is so expensive that only the rich can a¤ord it, then onlookers can infer that anyone they see consuming it must be rich. Allowing others to make that inference may bring various bene…ts to the conspicuous consumer. A variety of economic models have been developed under which it is optimal for consumers to behave in this way (e.g., Bikhchandani et al., 1992; Coelho and McClure, 1993; Bagwell & Bernheim, 1996; Frijters, 1998; Corneo and Jeanne, 1999; Bianchi, 2002 ).
Here we take this consumer behavior as given, rather than trying to "explain" it within a rational actor framework, and instead ask how …rms might manage fashion innovation in order to exploit this behavior in order to maximize pro…ts. There is already a large management science/operations research literature providing practical guidance to fashion goods producers, but it does not treat the rate of fashion innovation as the decision variable of interest. Rather, A partial exception is Swann's (2001) case study of the evolution of two prestige cars, the Rolls Royce and the Ferrari. However, that is more of an interesting descriptive analysis of a particular case than an e¤ort to derive prescriptive insights from a general model.
The closest analog in the literature to the current investigation is Pesendorfer's (1995) innovative paper. As in our model, Pesendorfer's fashion producer dynamically optimizes the timing of fashion innovations and, …nds, as do we, that the optimal solution could involve introduction of new fashions at …xed, regular intervals whose period varies inversely with the cost of innovation. There are three signi…cant di¤erences, however. First, Pesendorfer explicitly models the behavior of two discrete types of individuals and the producer's decision about how to vary the price of a given fashion over time. In that sense, Pesendorfer's focus is on creating a rational-actor model of fashion that includes the incentives of producers not just consumers, whereas, again, we just take consumer's taste for fashion (meaning products di¤erentiated from low-cost al-6 ternatives) as a given.
Second, Pesendorfer thinks of innovations as discrete. At some …xed unit cost, the innovator can create a new design that is completely di¤erentiated from the current design, and renders the current design instantly and completely obsolete. However, it seems more realistic to think of a product design space. Innovation implies moving one's product within that space, and one could move a little (minor innovation) or a long way (major innovation). One or the other might turn out to be optimal, depending on the particular circumstances, but the model should recognize that the producer has that choice, rather than assuming arbitrarily that all innovation must necessarily be draconian.
We address only a single-dimensional product space, which is clearly an abstraction. Even a simple item of clothing has multiple attributes (color, fabric, length, texture, etc.). Still, we view allowing even a one-dimensional continuum to be an advance. Related to this, we view the cost of innovation as increasing in the "amount of innovation". Consider test marketing, for example. Understanding how consumers will react to modest variations might be relatively easy, but accurately predicting the response to a radical change might require more market research. Likewise, it might take more advertising to persuade people that what initially seems like a very extreme departure from current trends will in fact become de rigeur. Indeed, Barnett and Freeman (2001) found, albeit in the context of technological not fashion innovation, that …rm mortality rates increase with the simultaneous introduction of multiple signi…cant innovations.
The third and most important di¤erence between our model and Pesendor- In our model we assume there is a single innovative "fashion czar" that de…nes what is fashionable within the product space. This is an outcome Pesendorfer found to be among the plausible competitive equilibria. Essentially if all consumers believe that only the fashion czar is capable of creating fashion, then this will be the equilibrium outcome. The fashion czar's product is imitated by low-cost producers who are not strategic about their fashion inno-9 vation. That is, the fashion czar might invest in costly activities that support innovation such as "cool hunting" (gathering intelligence about trend-setting consumers'preferences, see, e.g., Gladwell, 1997) Note two di¤erences with some articles in the literature. First, some models of fashion cycles are based on innovation and imitation by consumers who are conformists or non-conformists with regard to purchasing decisions (e.g., Matsuyama, 1992). Here it is producers who innovate or imitate. Second, portions of the fashion cycle literature assume that unit production costs are identical for "in" and "out" products since they are functionally identical; in our model it is allowable and perhaps even more reasonable to think of the fashion czar as having higher production costs.
Thus we imagine a market populated by heterogeneous …rms. One …rm optimizes, at some nontrivial information processing cost; others follow heuristic strategies that are cheaper to implement. This structure is akin to that of Conlisk (1980) and Sethi & Franke (1995) , but our model is continuous time and the producers'decisions pertain to product design, speci…cally where they position their products in some product space.
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In the model X represents the decision maker's position in some consumer product space, and Y represents the position of a competitor in that same space. The notion of a product space here is a one-dimensional abstraction of the key attribute of some consumer good. E.g., it could be width of neckties. is constantly changing as the high mark-up labels seek to distinguish themselves from the low cost providers.
The imitator's corporate strategy is simply to imitate the market leader (X), so Y always chases X. Pesendorfer (1995) suggests that one can think of Y not just as a single follower, but rather as a group of followers, which motivates the absence of strategic behavior on their part. Not only do they lack market research capability and other prerequisites to strategic behavior, but they may also each be relatively small, making it hard to amortize …xed costs of such strategic infrastructure. For this reason our problem is formulated as an optimal control problem, not a dynamic game.
Thus the system dynamics for this model would be simply:
where u is the control variable.
The product space is constrained by zero and one (neckties of in…nite width make no sense); so that
Since Y just follows X, expression (3) implies that Y is also e¤ectively constrained to be between zero and one without needing to make this explicit.
The fashion leader's objective function balances the cost of fashion innovation against the bene…ts of sales, where sales are highest if the fashion-leader's product is well-di¤erentiated in product space from the low-cost imitator's product. For simplicity we assume that pro…ts grow as the square of the distance between the innovator's and imitator's products. Note sales and pro…ts in this model do not depend on the absolute location of either …rm in product space since fashion is not useful per se, except to di¤erentiate (Pesendorfer, 1995). Extensions in which consumers care not only about di¤erentiation but also about the absolute position in product space could be an interesting topic for further research. The greater the rate of innovation, the more costly that innovation is.
In particular, it is assumed here that the cost of innovation is linear in the rate of innovation. Hence, the fashion-setter's objective function is:
As an alternative to expression (2) we could have chosen the formulation
with k > 0 measuring the speed of convergence. However, by an appropriate time transformation it can be shown that increasing k has the same e¤ect as jointly increasing the switching cost c and decreasing the discount rate r: Hence, nothing is lost by normalizing k equal to 1; which has the advantage that the number of parameters in the model is reduced.
Properties of Optimal Solutions
Before beginning detailed analysis, it is useful to make some observations about the nature of optimal solutions to this problem. Most are self-evident or require only a brief explanation, but collectively they help delineate the space within which one must search for optimal solutions.
Proposition 1 If it is optimal to exercise control, it is optimal to jump all the way to a boundary (X = 0 or X = 1).
This follows from the observation that the cost of moving is linear in the distance moved, but the bene…t is convex. An immediate implication is that once the fashion leader has reached a boundary, the leader will subsequently always be at one boundary or the other.
Proposition 2 Once the fashion leader has reached a boundary, and hence will always be at a boundary, then by symmetry the problem becomes a onedimensional dynamic program whose state is the distance D the imitator is away from that boundary, with value function V which satis…es
Proposition 3 Assume the fashion leader is at a boundary (X = 0 or 1). Let D 0 be some distance such that when the imitator is that distance away, the fashion setter prefers jumping to the opposite boundary over staying in place.
Then for all D < D 0 , the fashion setter would also rather jump to the opposite boundary than stay in place.
Proof. This is because the cost of moving is the same while the revenue is higher Corollary 4 If it is ever optimal to jump away from a boundary, it is optimal to continue to jump forever.
This follows from Proposition 3 because all jumps leave the fashion leader at the boundary, and eventually the shadow approaches that boundary arbitrarily close.
Corollary 5
If it is optimal to jump more than once, it is optimal to jump forever.
This follows from Proposition 1 (all jumps, including the …rst, are to a boundary) and Corollary 4.
Corollary 6
When the fashion leader is at a boundary, the optimal strategy is fully characterized by a single distance parameter D 0 . If the imitator's distance from the boundary D D 0 , then the fashion leader should jump immediately.
Otherwise, the fashion leader should wait until D decreases to D 0 and then jump. In the next sections we show that all these seven strategies actually occur for some parameter values. would become less than D 0 , making it no longer optimal to stay.
As will be illustrated below, all other combinations of strategies can co-exist.
That is, for all other combinations of strategies, there exist parameter values such that any one of those strategies can be optimal depending on the initial conditions. What is striking is that analytic expression can be written fully characterizing most of the boundaries (so-called DNS thresholds) separating the regions where each of the alternative strategies is optimal. These boundaries are found by equating the value functions computed under each candidate optimal strategy. It is to the computation of those value functions that the discussion turns next.
Solution structure for low unit cost
To begin the analysis suppose that the market leader's product is initially at one of the boundaries of product space and, without losing generality, suppose it is at the lower end, X = 0; and Y < 1=2: (If initially X = 0 and Y > 1=2 then any innovation would be both costly and revenue-reducing, so clearly the fashion-setter should do nothing at least until Y < 1=2.) If the cost of making new designs is low, then when the imitator gets close enough to 0, the decision maker's position in the product space will move from zero to one. Later, when the imitator comes su¢ ciently close to one, the trend-setter will jump from one back to zero as fast as possible. Since the control variable appears linearly in the optimization problem and is unbounded, these movements take the form of discrete jumps. In this way the solution structure depicted in Figure 1 is obtained.
This section contains two subsections. In the …rst subsection the properties of the cycle in Figure 1 are investigated. By doing this we obtain an upper bound on the unit cost for which this solution structure is in fact optimal. The aim of the second subsection is to …nd all points (X; Y ) at which the decision maker is indi¤erent between jumping to zero and jumping to one: It turns out that all these points are situated on a curve, which in the optimal control literature is called a Skiba-curve. This literature was initiated by Skiba (1978) , who in a one state optimal control model detected a threshold (the Skiba point) at which the decision maker is indi¤erent between either converging to a positive steady state or converging to zero. Haunschmied et al. (2003) extended this analysis to a two state optimal control model so, as in the present paper, due to the extra dimension, the Skiba point becomes a Skiba curve.
Properties of the Cycle
On the cycle it holds that either X = 1 or X = 0 (see Figure 1 ): Let Y 0 be the position of the imitator in the product space at which the decision maker is indi¤erent between staying at zero or jumping from zero to one, and, analogously, Y 1 is the imitator's position for which the market leader is indi¤erent between staying at one or jumping from one to zero. De…ning T 1 to be the length of the time interval at which X = 1; and T 0 is the time interval length at which X = 0; it can be obtained from expression (2) that
Only the relative positions in the product space matter, which implies that
Since Y has the same value at the end of the interval where X = 1; and at the beginning of the interval where X = 0, it holds that: as on the …rst interval, and this also holds for all consecutive intervals of time length T: Therefore, the objective value becomes:
The …rst order condition eventually leads to c = 1 r (r + 2) Proof. From (7) it can be obtained that Y 0 = 1=2 for c = 0: Furthermore, due to this same expression it can be shown that for Y 0 = 1=2 it holds that dc dY0 = 0; even when the cost of design change is almost zero. For the sake of illustration, optimal interval lengths T for various parameter values are depicted in Figure   3 .
The following result provides an upper bound on the cost of changing the design above which it is not optimal to have a solution structure as depicted in Proof. By letting Y 0 ! 0 in (7), we obtain that c = Note that Proposition 10 does not imply that designs will not be changed at all for c > 1 2(r+2) : If initially the market leader's product is in the interior of the product space (0 < X < 1); an initial design change such that X jumps to one of the boundaries and then stays there may still be optimal. This possibility will be explored in Section 6.
Skiba Curve
The aim of this subsection is to …nd a curve in the (X; Y ) plane on which the fashion trendsetter is indi¤erent between choosing the design X = 0 or X = 1:
By de…nition the outside points of this curve are (0; Y 0 ) and (1; 1 Y 0 ) : It is also clear that (1=2; 1=2) must be part of the Skiba curve.
To …nd an analytical expression for the whole curve we consider an arbitrary point X; Y ; with Y 0 < Y < 1 Y 0 : Then we evaluate the objective values for an immediate upward jump to 1 and an immediate downward jump to 0. Those points X; Y ; for which both values are equal, belong to the Skiba curve.
First we consider an immediate upward jump from X to 1: On the initial time interval, say 0 < t < t, Y increases from Y to 1 Y 0 : Then, from that moment on the solution structure depicted in Figure 1 applies, the objective value of which is given by V (see (6) ). This implies that the value of the objective, V up X; Y ; corresponding to "jumping upward" is
which can be rewritten as
Analogously, we consider an immediate downward jump from X to 0 and evaluate the objective value
To obtain the Skiba curve, we equate the objective values of jumping upwards 24 and downward. In the appendix it is obtained that this gives:
This is the Skiba curve, although we note that there is no explicit expression for Y 0 : Instead, it is implicitly given by (7) . For the parameter values r = 0:1 and c = 0:1;
the Skiba curve is depicted in Figure 4 . . This implies that then it can never be optimal to change the design in such a way that X jumps from a level lower than Y to a level that is higher than Y; or vice versa.
After excluding such design changes, three candidate policies are left, namely:
starting from a situation where X > Y ; jump up to X = 1 but make no subsequent design changes in the future. The value of the objective that results from this policy is
starting from a situation where X < Y , jump down to X = 0 but make no subsequent design changes in the future. Then the value of the objective is
stay at X; which gives
The fashion trend-setter is indi¤erent between making only an initial design change leading to an upward jump of X and making no change at all, when The results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 11 (a) Consider the c-region It should be noted that the Skiba curve X = Y ; denoted by (11), is not really relevant since here the unit cost is too large for periodic design changes to be optimal. Instead, it is better to refrain from doing any design changes when To determine the size of the region where making no design changes is optimal (so far we only know that it includes X = :5 and Y = :5) we have to determine two other Skiba curves. The …rst one includes those points where jumping up followed by periodic design changes gives the same objective value as making no changes. On the second one the fashion trend-setter is indi¤er-ent between a policy of jumping down followed by periodic design changes, and making no changes in the design. A numerical example in which these curves occur is depicted in Figure 8 .
In Figure 8 two other regions occur, where it is in fact optimal to have an initial period of making no design change followed by a jump to the cycle. Here the idea is that when the …rst jump is upward (downward) it is only optimal to make this design change after the imitator has moved in the downward (upward) direction for a su¢ ciently long time. Only then does jumping create a large enough di¤erence between the two designs for the trend-setter to make enough pro…ts to o¤set the cost of making the jump. Within the region "wait-up"
("wait-down") the upward (downward) movement takes place at the moment that Y reaches the lower (upper) boundary of this region. In Appendix B we provide some details on the computation of these Skiba curves.
Conclusions
Fashions change and even cycle. A variety of models have been advanced to explain why. Most have focused on consumers'tastes and behavior. Pesendorfer (1995) introduced perhaps the best-known model that explicitly considers optimal dynamic strategies for suppliers of fashion goods. It focuses on the monopoly case. However, it is not always easy to protect intellectual property claims concerning fashion (as opposed to technical) innovations. Indeed, two basic elements of the fashion industry are constant innovation by high-end designer labels and low-cost "knock-o¤" brands striving to o¤er products that look like those of the trend-setters.
Here we introduce a model whose solution describes how a high-end trendsetter ought to respond to competition from one or more low-cost imitators when the product space is bounded and consumers value one design over another 32 only to the extent that it is distinguishable from the low-cost products. That is, consumers have no intrinsic preference for one design over another, and it is not possible for innovators to improve a product along some unbounded directional dimension, always leading followers in that particular direction (e.g., constantly
by making faster and faster microchips).
The optimal strategy depends on the parameter values and, in many cases, there is state-dependency. However, when the costs of innovation are low enough, the trend-setter should innovate inde…nitely even though the product space is bounded. I.e., it is optimal to create fashion cycles. Because there is no notion of one side of product space being intrinsically better or worse than the other, the optimal initial direction of innovation depends on the innovator and imitator's initial positions in product space. In particular, a two-dimensional Skiba curve separates regions in state space within which it is optimal for the innovator to begin by moving "left" or "right" in product space.
Not surprisingly, when the costs of innovation are high enough, the optimal strategy involves no innovation. The trend-setter simply milks the pro…ts available because of its initial product di¤erentiation, but is eventually overtaken by imitators who by virtue of their lower cost structure take over the entire market.
Sometimes it is optimal for the trend-setter to extend this transient leadership with a single innovation.
For intermediate costs there are initial positions such that the innovator is indi¤erent between embarking on a long-term strategy of innovating inde…nitely and one of these alternate strategies. Again, the collection of these indi¤erence points constitute Skiba curves. Indeed, there are places in state space where several di¤erent Skiba curves meet. Furthermore, in most instances it is possible to write explicit analytical expressions characterizing these two-dimensional
Skiba curves and to explore how they depend on various model parameters.
Given our one-D abstraction of product space, some aspects of the optimal solution are arti…cial, such as the idea that fashion bounces forever between the same two points. In reality, although may be simple cycling in one dimensional projections of the higher dimensional product space (e.g., a color can be in, then out of fashion, then back in again), the true product space is of much higher-dimension. Translating the insights of our stylized model back into that richer, more realistic image of the variety possible in fashion goods, we would obtain the following prediction. We would expect the fashion leader to make bold moves (equivalent to jumping from one boundary to another) in directions that maximally di¤erentiate it from the followers, while still remaining within the realm of what is "feasible" in customers'minds. That is in fact not a bad characterization of what is done at fashion shows. forever" and "jump up and follow cycle" are not optimal anymore. The reason is that from B onwards, staying at the current value of X one immediately enters the region where "jumping up" is better than "staying". This implies that a jump taking place at any point in time after leaving B is better than staying forever or jumping immediately. This means that to the left of A and around the "naive triple point" T another policy has to be considered, namely "wait until Y has reachedỸ and then jump up". The value of this policy is
wheret is given by the time that Y reachesỸ , i.e.,
Since Y = X (X Y start ) e t ; the integral in (13) equals 
Since the term in brackets (depending onỸ ) does not depend on Y start , the maximization of V wait up w.r.t.Ỹ does not depend on Y start . Clearly this valueỸ will be below the A-B-T line in Figure 9 . At point T, i.e., for Y = 0:27431 and X = 0:242 17 in Figure 9 we numerically obtainỸ = 0:2475 which means thatỸ is closer to the 45 line than to T.
It should be noted that the di¤erence V wait up V up > 0 can be interpreted as the option value of waiting.
